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Abstract
We analyze the performance of venture-backed IPOs on the New York Stock Exchange and
Nasdaq between 2011 and 2019. Throughout this period, a large number of venture-backed
tech companies with billion-dollar valuations have gone public, and many have experienced
significant valuation cuts during their first months of trading.
By using multiple regression analysis and the Mann-Whitney U test, we find evidence
of a positive relationship between offer size and first-day returns. We also find that
tech companies and unprofitable companies achieve higher first-day returns than other
companies. When looking at the three months after the first day of trading, the analyses
indicate opposite effects, and we find that unprofitable tech companies going public achieve
significantly lower returns than other companies. However, results for the three-month
time period are in general less conclusive than those for the first-day of trading. Contrary
to our hypothesis, the amount of pre-IPO funding does not seem to affect aftermarket
performance.
Keywords – NHH, master thesis, initial public offerings, venture capital
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Background
The initial public offering market of 2019 has been strange. High-profile unicorns1 such
as Uber, Lyft and Slack have gone public this year, with less than stellar performance -
all trading well below their offer prices shortly after their initial public offerings (IPOs).
Another highly anticipated IPO, WeWork, was delayed indefinitely after public markets
basically revolted against their $47 billion valuation. This was later cut down to $8 billion
(Klebnikov, 2019). As of 30 September 2019, companies such as Groupon, Spotify and
Snap were also trading below their IPO offer prices (Carlson, 2019).
These companies share a few key characteristics:
• They all define themselves as “tech companies”
• Before they went public, they were heavily funded by venture capitalists
• Their IPOs were among the largest of 2019
• They were unprofitable when they went public2
It is easy to draw lines between the IPO class of 2019 and the dot-com boom in the
late 90’s. Not since then have so many highly valued tech companies gone public in
such short time (Grocer and Russell, 2019). Both then and now, tech companies spent
enormous amounts on advertisement, bragged about their ability to change the world,
but struggled to find a path to profitability. And both then and now, valuations of billion
dollar tech-companies have been dramatically reduced in a matter of weeks (Thompson,
2019).
This mildly troubling development forms the backdrop for this thesis, where we will search
for patterns for which companies experience similar stock price movements after going
public.
1Term used to describe a privately held startup company valued at over $1 billion
2Grocer and Russell (2019)
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1.2 Problem Definition
As the stock exchanges in the world where most high-profile IPOs take place, we focus on
new listings on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq. Since 2010, there have
been around 1 600 listings on these two stock exchanges, including all the aforementioned
companies. In light of the growing venture capital industry and increasing amounts of
private investments in unlisted companies, we will focus on companies that have raised
external funding in the private market prior to going public. For the sake of convenience,
we will refer to all private funding as venture capital. Specifically, we will investigate
whether their stock performance in the first three months of trading can be explained by
selected publicly available information, such as the four characteristics mentioned above.
The intention of this exercise is not to predict after-market performance of specific future
IPOs, which would demand a much higher level of detail and careful consideration of
individual companies. Rather, we will address macro trends in the IPO landscape, such as
increasing access to private equity financing and seemingly decreasing investor demands
for profitability in the immediate future. As such, we aim to identify correlations rather
than causalities.
In order to do this, we will use statistical analysis to explore the relationship between stock
returns and selected explanatory variables, including amount of pre-IPO funding, IPO size,
profitability, and industry. When analyzing post-IPO stock performance, first-day trading
gains are most often analyzed separately. Thus, two separate time horizons for stock
returns will be examined: returns from the first day of trading after IPO, and from the
subsequent three months of trading, excluding first-day trading gains. The three-month
time horizon is chosen because it enables investigation of short-to-medium-run returns
while also capturing as many of the 2019 IPOs as possible.
32 Theory
Before diving into the dataset of our thesis, established theory and previous studies will be
examined to further understand our problem definition. We will start by introducing the
most important financial expressions used in the thesis, before studying the key findings
of previous research. These findings, together with the trends mentioned in the chapter
regarding our motivation, will form the hypothesis of our thesis.
2.1 Relevant Theory and Definitions
Equity Financing for Private Companies
As the thesis investigates companies that raised external capital before going public, it is
relevant to assess the processes for equity financing of private companies. In Corporate
Finance (2017), Berk and DeMarzo outline the typical equity financing life cycle of a
successful startup firm. Figure 2.1 illustrates a typical funding story for a successful firm,
from idea to IPO, where all funding rounds have been added together. The length of each
bar indicates the firm’s post-money valuation, in other words the enterprise value of the
firm after investments have been made, or after the firm has gone public. The percentages
within each bar indicate the ownership split between the founder, venture capitalists, and
the public. In the example below, the firm raised $3 million in external funding (pre-IPO
funding) before going public, and raised another $4 million in their IPO (offer size).
Figure 2.1: Typical Funding Story of a Successful Startup Firm
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When someone starts a business, they usually provide the initial capital necessary by
themselves or with help from their immediate family. As the business grows, however, the
need for increasingly larger amounts of capital makes it necessary to seek sources of outside
capital. This funding can be raised from several potential sources, such as angel investors,
venture capital firms, institutional investors, corporate investors, and crowdfunding. In
this thesis, we will not distinguish between funding from different sources, but simply
refer to all as pre-IPO funding.
The first outside capital a company raises is typically from a so-called angel investor. An
angel investor is often a wealthy individual willing to help new companies get started in
exchange for a share of the business. This investment is typically followed by a seed round,
where the source can for instance be angel investors, groups of angel investors, accredited
investors or equity crowdfunding groups (Sarath, 2019). Following the seed round, the
next rounds of funding are commonly named alphabetically, and referred to as Series A,
Series B and so on.
Although all pre-IPO capital can be described as venture capital, these alphabetically
named rounds are considered the stage where venture capital firms join the party.
Venture Capital
A venture capital (VC) firm is a limited partnership that specializes in raising money to
invest in the private equity of young firms (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). Investors in venture
capital funds are typically large institutions, such as pension funds, financial firms, and
insurance companies (Zider, 1998).
Over the past 50 years, the venture capital industry has grown enormously. Both when
measured in number of deals and in total investment volume, the sector grew steeply in
the 1990s, and peaked at the height of the internet boom in 2000. The activity declined
significantly after the tech bubble burst, but has since then grown back to late 1990s
levels, despite a dip after the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017).
In order to cash in on their investment, venture capitalists have two main exit strategies
to choose from: through an acquisition, or through a public offering (Berk and DeMarzo,
2017).
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The Initial Public Offering
An initial public offering is the process in which a company sells shares of its stock to
the public for the first time. The shares sold in the IPO may either be new shares that
raise new capital, or existing shares that are sold by the current shareholders (Berk and
DeMarzo, 2017). The first-mentioned is called a primary offering, and is typically used
to finance further growth. The latter is called a secondary offering, and is the action
that offers a direct exit opportunity for the venture capitalists at the time of the IPO.
Alternatively, the venture capitalists holds on to their share until some time after the
IPO, and sell them on the public market(Berk and DeMarzo, 2017).
The amount of capital raised in an IPO can be referred to in several ways. We will mainly
use offer size or IPO size. As a company does not have to list 100% of their shares in
their IPO, the offer size must not be confused with the enterprise value of a company.
2.2 Literature Review
The Changing Role of the IPO
The main motive of going public has traditionally been to achieve greater liquidity
and better access to capital (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). Through both the initial and
subsequent offerings, companies are typically able to raise larger amounts of capital in
the public compared to the private markets. Increased liquidity of the firm’s stock, as
a consequence of public trading and continuously adjustments of market values, makes
the company a less risky investment. This can contribute to easier access to additional
capital (Beck, 2017).
However, as mentioned above, public offerings are not only a means of accessing external
capital, but also a typical exit strategy for existing investors. In an article published
in 2018, Døskeland and Strömberg find that the private capital markets are increasing
relative to the public markets, and particularly growth companies in the tech industry
stay private longer. Thus, the role of the IPO might be shifting from mainly being a
way of raising capital to mainly being a way for venture capitalists to cash in on their
investments in startup companies.
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Underpricing
When assessing research on aftermarket performance, the phenomenon of IPO underpricing
is widely discussed in academic literature. Underpricing can be defined as when the IPO
price is lower than the closing price at the first trading day of an IPO (Berk and DeMarzo,
2017), and will often be referred to as first-day returns in this thesis. In the time period
between 1960 and 2015, the average first-day return in the US market was 17% (Berk
and DeMarzo, 2017), which serves as evidence of considerable average underpricing. As
company shares are sold at a price below what the market would evidently be willing
to pay, underpricing is a substantial indirect cost for the company conducting the IPO
(Loughran and Ritter, 2002). In 2002, Loughran and Ritter calculated that the average
IPO leaves $9.1 million on the table, which is twice of the average fees paid to investment
bankers.
In the IPO process, the party that buys the securities from the issuing company and sells
them on to investors is called an underwriter (Banton, 2019). When underwriters provide
firm commitments, they expose themselves to a certain risk: if they overestimate the
interest in the market, the underwriter might end up having to sell shares at a lower price
than they bought them for, thereby taking a loss (Banton, 2019). To minimize their own
exposure to this risk, underwriters hence have the incentive to intentionally underprice
IPOs (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). Loughran and Ritter (2002) stated that only 9% of all
US IPOs between 1990 and 1998 experienced a fall in share price on the first trading day,
and for 16% the offer price is the same as the price at the end of the first day. In other
words, the majority of IPOs in this period experienced a price increase, meaning they
were underpriced.
Aftermarket Performance
While IPOs tend to be underpriced at offer, they appear to underperform in the long-run.
Ritter (1991) defined “long-run” as a three-year period, calculated from the closing market
price on the first day of public trading to the market price on the three-year anniversary.
First-day returns are excluded to isolate underpricing from long-run performance. In his
studies from 1991, Ritter found that his sample of 1 526 American IPOs in the period
from 1975 to 1984 significantly underperformed against a set of comparable firms that
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went public longer back in time. Together with Ivo Welch, he later confirmed his findings
with the article “A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations” published in 2002.
Ritter and Welch (2002) investigated IPOs between 1980 and 2001 and found that for the
subsequent three years the IPOs underperformed the market by an average of 23.4%.
Like Ritter, we will exclude first-day trading gains when looking at aftermarket performance.
However, in light of the disappointing performance of the mentioned IPO class of 2019,
we want to investigate more immediate effects of the IPOs. Consequently, this thesis will
assess the aftermarket performance for the first three months after going public.
Overestimating Growth Opportunities
Ritter (1991) mentions risk mismeasurement and bad luck as possible explanations for the
phenomenon of underperformance in the aftermarket, as well as the scenario of “fads and
over-optimism”. The latter is particularly interesting, as it is likely to be valid for highly
anticipated IPOs such as Uber, Lyft and Slack. The term “fads” was established by Shiller
(1990) as “scenarios of firms going public when investors are irrationally over-optimistic
about the future potential of certain industries” (Ritter, 1991). Ritter found that firms
with high adjusted first-day returns have a tendency to have the poorest aftermarket
performance (Ritter, 1991). As this effect is stronger for smaller and younger companies
than for more established companies, it might indicate that a tendency of over-optimism
exists; growth opportunities of IPOs seem to be systematically overestimated by investors.
There has been found evidence that the company’s age at the time of the IPO strongly
correlates with its aftermarket performance (Ritter, 1991). In his research, Ritter found
that relatively young growth companies were well represented among the long-term
underperformers, especially among those that IPOed in high-volume years. The same
group also tends to have the greatest first-day return. Conversely, more established
companies experience the opposite effect; less underpricing and higher long-run returns.
In their analysis of first-day returns of IPOs in Taiwan, Shen and Goo (2019) found a
positive correlation between aftermarket risk and first-day returns. Interpreting age as a
proxy for aftermarket risk, where young companies are more risky than older companies,
their observations are consistent with the concept that risky issues experience higher
average first-day returns (Ritter, 1991).
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Similar patterns are shown when assessing the size of the IPO and their IPO performance.
Ritter (1991) found that smaller IPOs have the highest average adjusted first-day returns,
as well as the poorest aftermarket performance. These findings confirmed his previous
work with Randolph P. Beatty in 1986, where they argued that also the offer size could
be used as a proxy for risk. Smaller offerings tend to be more speculative than larger
offerings, hence experiencing higher first-day return (Ritter and Beatty, 1986).
This finding is particularly interesting when investigating the extreme underperformance
of the mentioned unicorns that went public in 2019. As the largest IPOs of today do
not involve well-established and profitable companies, but rather growing tech companies
without a certain path to profitability, the findings of Ritter and Beatty from 1986 may
no longer be valid.
The Effect of Being Backed by Venture Capital
Earlier this year, Crunchbase, a leading platform for company insights, published an
article stating that there are more VC funds than ever, that the average transaction size
is increasing and that giant tech companies are able to raise private financing rounds of
sizes that were never possible before (Rowley, 2019). Yet, there has not been done much
research on how the amount of pre-IPO funding relates to first-day or long-term stock
performance. However, there has been done research on how venture-backed companies
perform compared to non-venture-backed companies. The conclusions vary; whereas
Megginson and Weiss (1991) found that venture capital-backed IPOs between 1983 and
1987 were significantly less underpriced than others, Ritter (2019) found the opposite for
IPOs between 2009 and 2019. Given the more recent dataset, which also covered a longer
period of time, we consider Ritter’s findings more relevant for our work.
Concerning long-run performance, Brav and Gompers (1997) provide evidence of better
performance for VC-backed IPOs. They emphasize factors such as access to top-tier
investment banks, less information asymmetries and a demand of better corporate
governance as benefits of being venture-backed. Additionally, Brav and Gompers argue
that smaller non-venture-backed IPOs are more likely to be owned by individuals, who are
more likely to be affected by fads. The VC effect might be linked to Ritter and Beatty’s
findings of 1986 regarding a company’s size at IPO. They found that VC-backed IPOs
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usually are bigger because the amount of funding and guidance received have helped them
grow.
2.3 Hypotheses
The overall problem definition of our thesis was introduced in chapter 1. We wish to
explore the relationship between stock returns and the following four attributes: amount
of pre-IPO funding, IPO size, negative profitability, and status as tech company. The
research assessed in this chapter forms the basis of what we expect to find when analysing
the mentioned relationships, and therefore define our hypotheses.
There are typically high expectations related to large IPOs, and to IPOs of heavily venture-
backed companies. This also applies to tech companies, which can lead to investors being
over-optimistic of IPOs with either of these three characteristics. Further, both Ritter and
Beatty (1986), and Shen and Goo (2019) have found that risky IPOs in general experience
higher first-day returns than other IPOs. As future profitability cannot be taken for
granted, companies that have yet to deliver positive net earnings are more risky to invest
in than other companies. With all of this in mind, our first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: status as tech company, amount of pre-IPO funding, IPO size, and negative
profitability are all positively correlated with first-day return
Because firms with high first-day returns typically underperform in the longer run, our
second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: status as tech company, amount of pre-IPO funding, IPO size, and negative
profitability are all negatively correlated with three-month return, excluding first-day trading
gains
Lastly, we expect companies that hold multiple of the attributes to be even more affected,
leading to our third and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: When combining the characteristics, correlations on both first-day return
and three-month return will be even stronger than they are individually
We hope to contribute to prior research done on IPOs by testing these hypotheses on a
recent dataset consisting only of venture-backed IPOs. To our knowledge, there exists
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no literature on this specific group, and neither on the relationship between amount of
pre-IPO funding and post-IPO stock performance. In light of the increasing amounts
of private investments in unlisted companies, as well as other already mentioned macro
trends in the IPO landscape, we hope our work will be particularly relevant to the IPO
market going forward.
11
3 Data Collection and Cleaning
In order to answer our hypothesis, we need data on four key areas:
1. A set of companies going public to examine
2. Pre-IPO funding rounds for these companies
3. Pre-IPO accounting numbers for these companies
4. Post-IPO stock performance for these companies
In this chapter, we will explain were this data was found, as well as how it was cleaned
and compiled.
Initial Public Offerings
In order to investigate post-IPO stock performance, we need information about all the IPOs
that have taken place at NYSE and Nasdaq within the relevant time frame. The Securities
Data Company (SDC) Platinum database is ideal for this purpose. SDC Platinum is
an online historical financial transactions database, providing detailed information on
financial transactions such as new issues, mergers and acquisitions and private equity. As
we will use accounting data from the year before a company’s IPO for our analyses, and
the accounting data goes back to 2010, we use collect data from SDC Platinum on all
IPOs after 1 January 2011. Because they are critical for our analyses and data handling,
we remove entries where either offer price per share, offer size, or International Securities
Identification Number (ISIN) is missing. This returns a dataset with 1 531 IPOs.
Adjusting IPO Offer Prices for Stock Splits
To boost the liquidity of their shares, a company can divide its existing shares into multiple
shares. This action is called a stock split, and reduces the value of each share by the factor
induced by the stock split ratio. Conversely, companies can also conduct reverse stock
splits to increase the price of the stock. While the source from which we fetch historical
stock prices adjust for stock splits in their database, SDC do not. Because we intend to
use the offer price as a basis for calculation of returns, we hence need to adjust the offer
prices from SDC Platinum for stock splits.
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Historical data on stock splits is available at Investing.com’s Stock Split Calendar. In
order to efficiently extract data on all stock splits since 1 January 2011, we use a Python
script based on the Beautiful Soup library to scrape the Stock Split Calendar. This returns
a total of 3 230 stock splits, with split ratios ranging from 1:25 000 to 1 333:1. Each
ratio is then converted to a multiplier by finding the inverse of the ratio’s numerator and
denominator. We create an offer price multiplier by calculating the product of all the
multipliers for the same stock.
We then merge the stock split dataset with the IPO dataset. As companies can change
tickers over time, we might experience cases where a ticker belongs to different companies
in the two datasets. To overcome the possibility of mismatching offer price multipliers and
offer prices, and thus corrupting our dataset, we use a fuzzy string matching algorithm.
After merging the datasets using the company ticker as key, we test the similarity between
the company name column from each dataset. The results from this exercise are displayed
in table A1.1 in appendix A1.
Using the ticker as key, we found 13 matches between the stock split dataset and the IPO
dataset, and fuzzy matching uncovered 1 case where the ticker had changed owner since
the IPO. Thus, the offer price of 12 companies was adjusted for stock splits (and reverse
splits), with multipliers ranging from 150 to 0.17. When cross-checking against Seeking
Alpha, widely considered a reliable source of information about financial markets, we find
no indications that these multipliers are incorrect, and thus keep the adjusted offer prices
in the dataset.
Funding Rounds
As for IPOs, we collect data on funding rounds from SDC Platinum. One of their products,
VentureXpert, contains detailed information on investments in unlisted companies. As
we intend to investigate the relationship between pre-IPO funding and post-IPO stock
performance, we download data on pre-IPO investments in companies later listed on either
New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq.
For each investment, we collect the name and ticker of the company that was invested
in, disclosed and estimated investment amount, round number, and name and type of
investor. For investments where the disclosed investment amount is not available, we use
13
the estimated investment amount as replacement. In order to capture as much information
as possible, we collect data on all investments available in the database, dating back to
1965. This yields a dataset of 54 362 individual investments in 4 512 different companies.
Investments where neither disclosed nor estimated amount is available are removed from
the dataset, returning 48 676 individual investments in 3 902 different companies. Table
3.1 provides an overview of the most active investors in our dataset, measured by the
value of investment rounds they have participated in. As SDC do not distinguish between
types of investors, both venture capital and private equity investments are included.
Table 3.1: Most Active Investors
Investor Number ofInvestments
Sum of Investment Rounds
Participated In (mUSD)
Carlyle Investment Management 64 33 053
Thomas H Lee Partners 56 18 383
New Enterprise Associates 620 14 641
Sequoia Capital Operations 402 12 033
Bessemer Venture Partners 276 6 662
Technology Crossover Ventures 129 5 968
Energy & Minerals Group 3 4 284
RBC Capital Markets Corp 2 4 274
Boyu Capital Advisory Co Ltd 2 4 150
Polaris Growth Management LLC 220 3 903
As mentioned in chapter 2, investments in non-listed companies often happen in rounds
where the company raises funds from multiple investors at once. When a funding round is
announced, it is typically the total amount raised from all investors which is disclosed,
and not the amount invested by each individual investor. In order to avoid funding round
duplications, we therefore group the funding rounds by company name and round number,
returning a final dataset with 14 713 funding rounds, still for 3 902 companies.
As investment amounts are registered in nominal US dollar value, we use the cpi Python
library to adjust investment amounts for inflation in accordance with the US Consumer
Price Index. For later analyses, we then compute the total amount of funding raised
pre-IPO for each company, and merge with the IPO dataset.
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Accounting Data
In order to investigate the relationship between pre-IPO profitability and post-IPO stock
performance, we collect accounting information from the Orbis database. According to
themselves, Orbis is “the world’s most powerful comparable data resource on private
companies”. Because the accounting data from Orbis will be matched and merged with
the IPO dataset, we gather as much data from Orbis as possible in order to maximize the
number of matches. Thus, we download historical data on revenue, net income, industry
code, total assets and number of employees for all current and formerly publicly listed firms
in the database, 121 973 in total. This includes companies listed on all stock exchanges
in the world. As we will merge this data with data from SDC Platinum using ISIN, we
remove rows where ISIN in missing, leaving 105 725 companies.
Orbis provides historical data from 2010 and onwards, limiting us to assess worldwide
IPOs from 2011 and onwards. We remove companies with IPOs before this, thereby
reducing the number of companies in the Orbis dataset to 18 220. We then calculate
profit margin by dividing net income by revenue.
After merging with the IPO dataset, the size of the dataset is reduced to 1 250 companies.
At this point, the only data point missing is the target variable.
Stock Data
As stated earlier, we aim to see whether pre-IPO information can be used to explain
aftermarket stock performance. Thus, we gather historical stock price development for the
companies in the merged dataset from Yahoo Finance, using the yfinance Python library.
As we will investigate the stock price development following the IPO, we gather data
for the first 63 trading days, equivalent to three calendar months. In order to adjust for
market development in the same period, we also gather data for the development of the
S&P 500 index in the same period. The S&P 500 is a stock market index that measures
the performance of the 500 largest companies listed on US stock exchanges, and is widely
considered to be a good representation of the US stock market. Thus, we will use this as
a baseline to calculate abnormal returns. For first-day returns, where the IPO date is t,
this is done as follows:
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First-Day Return+ 1 =
Closing Pricet
Offer Price
S&P Return+ 1 =
S&P Closing Pricet
S&P Closing Pricet−1
Abnormal First-Day Return =
First-Day Return+ 1
S&P Return+ 1
Similarly, abnormal returns for the three months subsequent to the first day of trading
are calculated as follows:
Three-Month Return+ 1 =
Closing Pricet+62
Closing Pricet
S&P Return+ 1 =
S&P Closing Pricet+62
S&P Closing Pricet
Abnormal Three-Month Return =
Three-Month Return+ 1
S&P Return+ 1
An abnormal return above 1.00 can be interpreted as IPOs outperforming the S&P 500.
Conversely, an abnormal return of less than 1.00 indicates that the IPO was outperformed
by the S&P 500.
Out of the 1 250 companies in the dataset, historical stock price data is available for
871, due to for instance mergers and acquisitions, or companies going private. After
investigating the most extreme observations of returns, we manually change the data
points that are incorrect and we find the correct data. In other cases, for instance when
the data from Yahoo Finance is sporadically missing or inconsistent, we remove the data
point from the dataset.
Like we did for stock splits, we also perform a fuzzy string matching exercise in order to
avoid mismatching of companies and stock returns, leading to removal of 32 observations.
Table A1.2 in appendix A1 shows examples of fuzzy string matching results from this
exercise.
Finally, we manually remove observations where key data is missing or obviously incorrect.
Examples of obviously incorrect data include IPO dates and founding dates that are set to
the future, and negative amounts of pre-IPO funding. This exercise brings the number of
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observations down to 644. Because we intend to only examine companies that have raised
external capital in the private market before going public, we remove companies without
any information on this. This leaves us with a dataset consisting of 180 companies, which
we will use for our analyses.
Selection Bias
For our analyses to be reliable, it is essential that the observations in our dataset are
representative for the group we intend to analyse, namely venture-backed companies
that have gone public. Our data is collected from sources that are widely considered
as reliable, and we gathered all IPOs for the period we are investigating. The dataset
we started with should therefore be representative. Throughout the data cleaning and
compilation process, however, the number of companies in our dataset has been massively
reduced. The boiled-down dataset could be subject to selection bias, caused for instance
by higher degree of data availability for high-profile companies. Nevertheless, filtrations
are unavoidable in order to carry out the desired analyses.
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4 Descriptive Analysis
In this chapter, we will present descriptive analyses of our compiled and cleaned dataset.
After providing a general overview of the characteristics of the dataset, we will examine
distributions of the data points which will later be used for statistical analyses. We will
also plot selected independent variables against post-IPO returns, to see whether there
are any clear patterns that can be seen with the naked eye.
Note that whereas we calculated abnormal returns to be used as target variables in the
statistical analyses, we use simple stock returns for the descriptive analyses. As these
analyses are meant to be only indicative, simple returns are preferred because they are
easier to relate to and compare. Simple returns for the two time frames are calculated as
follows:
First-Day Simple Return =
Closing Pricet
Offer Price
− 1
Three-Month Simple Return =
Closing Pricet+62
Closing Pricet
− 1
General Descriptive Statistics
As already mentioned, we have data on 180 venture-backed IPOs, dating back to 2011.
The companies raised a median of $111.2 million in their offerings, and raised $140.0
million in pre-IPO funding. The median age of the companies when they filed for IPO
was 10.9 years, 22.8% of the companies in the dataset were profitable the year before
their IPO, and 31.1% were tech companies. Table 4.1 displays annual averages of these
metrics, where average offer sizes and pre-IPO funding amounts are adjusted for inflation.
There are no clear historical trends, perhaps with the exception of profitability the year
before IPO, although the lowest observations are in the middle of the time frame. This is
likely as a result of the narrow time frame in scope, as previous research has shown that
companies going public today are in general older, larger and to a lesser extent profitable
compared to companies that went public a few decades ago (Ritter, 2018).
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics, by Year
Year Numberof IPOs
Median Offering
Size (mUSD)
Median Pre-IPO
Funding
(mUSD)
Median Age
at IPO
(Years)
% Profitable
Year Before
IPO
% Tech
Companies
2011 7 152.4 366.5 12.3 42.9% 42.9%
2012 7 82.0 133.2 7.6 57.1% 28.6%
2013 33 112.6 147.5 8.4 36.4% 18.2%
2014 45 106.1 113.4 9.3 22.4% 31.1%
2015 21 107.9 112.3 9.5 4.8% 33.3%
2016 12 95.0 146.3 8.4 8.3% 25.0%
2017 22 111.3 122.4 10.7 22.7% 45.5%
2018 18 177.3 174.5 8.5 11.1% 33.3%
2019 15 175.8 1 166.2 9.3 13.3% 33.3%
Total 180 111.2 140.0 10.0 22.8% 31.1%
With regards to potential selection bias, these figures are roughly in line with previous
statistics. Ritter (2018) examined 834 VC-backed IPOs from between 2011 and 2017 and
found the median age to be between 10 and 12 for each of these years. Similarly to our
dataset, he also found the percentage of companies that were profitable when going public
to vary significantly, ranging from 16% to 64%. A likely explanation for why his numbers
are higher than ours is that Ritter measured profitability the year of IPO rather than the
year before, giving the companies more time to achieve profitability. Concerning offering
size, Renaissance Capital3, a company providing pre-IPO institutional research, reported
in 2018 annual median offer sizes of US IPOs to be slightly lower than those in our dataset.
Contrary to us, however, Renaissance Capital do not single out VC-backed IPOs. Before
removing non-backed IPOs from our dataset, we saw that they were on average smaller
than backed IPOs. For tech status and pre-IPO funding, we have not found any data that
could be used to validate our dataset against selection bias. Considering that the other
attributes are aligned with comparable datasets, there is nonetheless reason to believe
that our dataset is free of selection bias.
3Not to be confused with Renaissance Technologies, the hedge fund
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Returns
Calculated from the offer price, the median return for the IPOs in the dataset (table 4.2)
was 17.7% on the first day of trading, and 29.7% after three months. However, when the
first day of trading is excluded, the median return is lower, 7.4%. Although weak, the
trend seems to be that average first-day return has increased over the observed period.
Table 4.2: Average Simple Returns
Year 1 Day 3 Months, IncludingFirst Day of Trading
3 Months, Excluding
First Day of Trading
2011 14.8% 13.8% 2.5%
2012 8.4% 24.1% 12.5%
2013 28.6% 53.9% 21.0%
2014 27.8% 42.5% 14.1%
2015 32.1% 18.7% -9.2%
2016 30.7% 77.7% 35.2%
2017 17.7% 42.3% 18.2%
2018 33.0% 38.1% 2.8%
2019 44.6% 87.0% 16.0%
Total 28.2% 45.1% 12.8%
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of first-day trading gains of the IPOs in our dataset. It
is evident that most companies filing for IPO experience an appreciation in their share
price compared to the offer price of the IPO. This is in line with the phenomenon of
underpricing, as discussed in the literature review. On the negative end, the most extreme
observation in the dataset is Chegg Inc., who experienced a share price decline of 23% on
their first day of trading. On the positive of the scale is Beyond Meat, the producer of
plant-based meat substitutes whose share price rose by 163% on their first day of trading
in May 2019. This was the best first-day performance of a US IPO larger than $200
million since the dot-com boom (Murphy, 2019).
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of First-Day Simple Returns
When looking at the three-month horizon, the distribution is more spread out across the
axis, as illustrated in figure 4.2. Also here, Beyond Meat is on the far right. Even after
their remarkable price increase at the day of IPO, the Beyond Meat stock continued to
rise, tripling in value over the next three months of trading - totalling a value increase
of 686.0% from their offer price. At the other end of the axis is Castlight Health, a San
Francisco-based healthcare navigation company who experienced a stock price depreciation
of 57.6% in the three months following their IPO in March 2014.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Simple Returns Three Months After IPO
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Industries
By using the EU industry standards classification system (NACE) code of each company,
we can investigate whether there are patterns to be found when dividing companies by
industry. NACE divides companies into 21 broad sections. The top three most represented
sections in our dataset are Manufacturing (65 IPOs), Information and Communication
(56 IPOs), and Professional Scientific and Technical Activities (33 IPOs), leaving 26 IPOs
in other sections. This distribution is visualized in figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Dataset
Within the Manufacturing section, 32 out of 65 companies are manufacturers of
pharmaceutical preparations (NACE code 21.20), 11 are manufacturers of medical and
dental instruments and supplies (code 32.50), and 9 are manufacturers of electronic
components (code 26.11).
Within the Information and Communication section, 33 out of 56 companies are classified
as “publishers of other software” (code 58.29), 11 belong to “Other information technology
and computer service activities” (code 62.09), and 9 belong to “Computer programming
activities” (code 62.01). This section includes heavily funded companies such as Uber,
Snap, Facebook, Pinterest and Twitter, all among the top 10 most funded IPOs in our
dataset. For the sake of convenience, companies belonging to the Informantion and
Communication section will be referred to as “tech companies”, and other companies will
be referred to as“non-tech companies”.
Within the Professional Scientific and Technical Activities section, 28 out of 33 companies
operate within research and experimental development on biotechnology (code 72.11).
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Figure 4.4: Average Simple Returns, by ISIN Industry Section
Figure 4.4 shows average returns for the three sections described above, as well as for the
26 companies in other sections. Apart from Manufacturing companies, average return is
higher on the first day of trading than in the following three months for all industrys. Tech
companies experience the highest first-day returns, and nearly the lowest returns in the
following three months, only “beaten” by Professional Scientific and Technical activities.
Despite their slow start, manufacturing companies’ high returns in the following months
make them outperform the other industries when looking at three-month return.
Offer Size
When a company is filing for an initial public offering, they offer a number of shares to
the public for a given price per share. As mentioned in the theory section, the offer size
of an IPO is quite simply the number of shares offered to the market multiplied by the
offer price per share.
Figure 4.5 displays the distribution of inflation-adjusted offer sizes in our dataset. The
majority of the observations raised between $50 and $150 million when they went public,
and only 13 companies raised less than $50 million. This aligns with the median offer size
of US IPOs in 2014, which according to Berk and DeMarzo (2017) was $100 million. By
significant margin, the largest IPO in the dataset are Alibaba and Facebook, raising $23.1
and $17.5 billion, respectively. Adding Uber’s $8.1 billion IPO, the top three raised more
than the other 177 companies in the dataset combined - $48.7 vs. $36.4 billion.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Offer Sizes
In figure 4.6, offer size is plotted against first-day and three-month returns, respectively. In
order to adjust for skewness in offer sizes, a base-10 log scale is used for the horizontal axis.
There seems to be a slight correlation between first-day return and offer size, although
some of the largest IPOs in the dataset achieved modest or even negative returns on their
first day of trading.
Figure 4.6: Plotting Simple Returns Against Offer Size
For three-month returns, on the other hand, it is not possible to identify any clear pattern
when plotting against offer size.
Amount of Pre-IPO Funding
Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of pre-IPO funding amount. The shape of this histogram
is fairly similar to the one displaying offer size distribution, likely indicating a covariance
between offer size and pre-IPO funding amount.
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of Pre-IPO Funding Amount
Slightly over a third of the companies in the dataset raised between $50 and $150 million
in pre-IPO funding, and three quarters raised less than $250 million. 16 companies raised
more than $750 million, and the range within this group is enormous: the three companies
that raised the most funding were Uber ($11.9 billion), Alibaba ($9.6 billion) and Lyft
($5.0 billion). Their combined pre-IPO funding amount, $26.5 billion, constitutes 38% of
all the funding amounts in our dataset added together.
When pre-IPO funding amounts are plotted against returns, as illustrated in figure 4.8, it
is difficult to spot any clear trends apart from a more scattered distribution of returns
with the longer time horizon. As or offer size, a base-10 log scale is used for the horizontal
axis.
Figure 4.8: Plotting Simple Returns Against Pre-IPO Funding Amount
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Company Age at IPO
Figure 4.9 shows distribution of company age at IPO. The younger end of the scale is filled
predominantly with pharmaceutical companies, with Spark Therapeutics as the youngest
company going public in our dataset. Spark develops gene therapies, and filed for IPO in
January 2015, only two years after the company’s inception in 2013. The oldest company
for which we were able to find reliable data was NGL Energy Partners, who waited 71
years before going public in 2011.
Figure 4.9: Distribution of Company Age at IPO
Similarly to earlier, it is difficult to spot any clear patterns when age is plotted against
returns, as displayed in figure 4.10. Thus, a statistically significant linear correlation
between returns and company age at IPO is unlikely. As earlier, a base-10 log scale is
used for the horizontal axis.
Figure 4.10: Plotting Simple Returns Against Company Age at IPO
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Profit Margin Year Before IPO
The most recent year for which Orbis provides accounting data is 2018. In order to
include IPOs from 2019, we will therefore use profit margin the year before IPO as
the measurement of profitability for our analyses. Thus, when discussing “unprofitable
companies”, we will refer to companies with negative profit margin the year before IPO.
As mentioned earlier, one of the main motives of an IPO has traditionally been to raise
capital in order to finance growth (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017). Driven by the increased
access to private growth capital provided by venture capitalists, companies today typically
wait longer before they file for IPO (Døskeland and Strömberg, 2018). Thus, one would
expect that companies going public today are more mature than they used to be. However,
this does not appear to be reflected when looking at the profitability of companies filing for
IPO in recent years. In fact, according to Rooney (2019), Goldman Sachs are forecasting
that less than a quarter of the companies going public in 2019 will report positive net
income this year, which is the lowest level since the tech bubble of the early 2000s. A
similar trend can be spotted in our dataset, as illustrated in figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11: % of Venture-Backed IPOs with Positive Profit Margin year before IPO
Figure 4.12 shows the distribution of profit margins the year before IPO. It is evident from
the figure that most of the companies in our dataset were unprofitable the year before
they filed for IPO, as already mentioned in the introduction. Out of the 180 companies,
only 39 (22.8%) reported a positive bottom line the year before their IPO.
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Figure 4.12: Distribution of Profit Margin Year Before IPO
Moreover, it stands out that 46 companies (25.6%) had profit margins lower than -100%.
40 of these companies are either biotechnology or pharmaceutical companies, both typically
research and development-heavy industries.
Figure 4.13 displays returns plotted against profit margin year before IPO, excluding the
nine companies with profit margins below -800%. As earlier, there are no clear patterns
suggesting a linear correlation between returns and profit margin year before IPO.
Figure 4.13: Plotting Simple Returns Against Profit Margin Year Before IPO
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5 Analyzing Individual Attributes
While we introduced and explored the dataset in the previous chapter, more targeted
analysis will be done in this chapter. The aim is to answer our first two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: status as tech company, amount of pre-IPO funding, IPO size, and negative
profitability are all negatively correlated with first-day return
Hypothesis 2: status as tech company, amount of pre-IPO funding, IPO size, and negative
profitability are all negatively correlated with three-month return, excluding first-day trading
gains
In order to successfully answer our hypotheses, we will make use of both non-statistical
and statistical analysis. Whereas the former will be used to visually search for patterns in
the performance of companies holding each of the attributes, the latter will be used to
examine whether or not the patterns are statistically significant.
The non-statistical analysis will be executed by dividing the dataset into groups based
on the four characteristics, which will be compared in order to see if there are any clear
patterns. Similarly to for the descriptive statistics, we will use simple returns for these
analyses.
To determine the statistical significance of the patterns, multiple regression analysis
will be used to investigate whether there are linear correlations between post-IPO stock
performance and the independent variables in the dataset. As stated in the data chapter,
we will use abnormal returns for these analyses.
In this chapter, each of the four characteristics in scope will be analyzed independently,
as outlined above. The next subchapter explains how the regression analysis was carried
out, before proceeding with analysis results in the subsequent subchapter.
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5.1 Method: Multiple Regression Analysis
To investigate whether there are statistically significant relationships between post-IPO
stock performance and the attributes, multiple regressions and the ordinary least squares
(OLS) method will be used. This method chooses the estimates that minimize the sum of
the squared residuals to provide as precise estimates as possible (Wooldridge, 2012).
5.1.1 Model Formulations
In our regressions, the first-day and three-month returns serve as the dependent variables.
In addition to the attributes that form part of our hypothesis, which are the independent
variables, we add certain data points from our dataset to serve as control variables.
Following, the regression models are formulated, before the different variables will be
further explained in the next sub-chapter.
Regression Model for the First Trading Day
logabnormalreturn1 = β0 + β1logtotalraised + β2logoffersize +
β3lognumberofemployees+ β4logageatipo+ β5Dprofitnegative + β6Dover250 + β7Dtech + ε
Regression Model for the First Three Months of Trading
logabnormalreturn90 = β0 + β1logtotalraised + β2logoffersize +
β3lognumberofemployees+ β4logageatipo+ β5Dprofitnegative + β6Dover250 + β7Dtech + ε
5.1.2 Explanation of Model Variables
In this section, we will provide brief explanations of the variables used in our regression
models. Most of the continuous variables are log-transformed to improve linearity. Further
details concerning this can be found in appendix A2.
Dependent Variables
First-day abnormal return: logabnormalreturn1
The dependent variable logabnormalreturn1 is the log-transformed abnormal return of the
first day of trading. The S&P 500 index is used as a benchmark to calculate the abnormal
return.
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Three-month abnormal return: logabnormalreturn90
The dependent variable logabnormalreturn90 is the log-transformed abnormal return for
the first three months of trading, excluding first-day trading gains. The value is calculated
by adjusting the return to the S&P 500 index for the same time period.
Independent Variables
Adjusted offer size: logoffersize
The offer size is the log-transformation of number of shares offered multiplied with the
price per share. As our dataset contains information on IPOs from 2011 and onwards, the
offer size has been adjusted with the US Consumer Price Index to make sure the data is
comparable.
Adjusted total raised before IPO: logtotalraised
The value of the variable is the log-transformed total amount of funding the company has
raised before their IPO. The different funding rounds are adjusted with the US Consumer
Price Index from the time the funding was raised.
Company age at IPO: logageatipo
The company’s age at IPO is found by subtracting the year when the company was
founded from the year they went public. As the age of a few companies were significantly
higher than most other companies, it is log-transformed.
Number of employees the year before IPO: lognumberofemployees
The variable is the log-transformed number of employees the company had the year before
they went public.
Dummy variable for tech companies: Dtech
The dummy variable has a value of one when the company is classified as a tech company,
and a value of zero for non-tech companies. As explained earlier, “tech companies” are
defined by using the EU industry standards classification system (NACE) code of each
company, where companies classified as “Information and communication” are set to be
“tech companies”.
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Dummy variable for negativ profit margins the year before IPO:
Dprofitnegative
The dataset contains the profit margins for each company the year before they went public.
The dummy holds a value of one if the company had a negative profit margin, and a value
of zero if they were profitable. As stated in previous chapters, we will simply refer to
these companies as “profitable” and “unprofitable” companies.
Dummy variable for companies that raised over $250 million before IPO:
Dover250
Instead of only investigating whether there is a linear relationship between the amount
of funding each company have raised before IPO and their returns post-IPO, we will
investigate if the most funded companies perform differently than others. The dummy
variables will therefore hold a value of one if the company raised $250 million or more.
These companies will be referred to as “heavily funded companies”. The dummy variable
will hold a value of zero for all other companies.
5.1.3 OLS Violations
There are certain assumptions that must hold true for the regression models to be accurate
(Wooldridge, 2014). The main assumptions for the ordinary least squares method are:
1. Linearity in the parameters
2. Random sampling
3. No perfect collinearity
4. Zero conditional mean
5. Homoscedasticity
To determine the validity of our analysis, violations of these assumptions have been
investigated. Variables are log-transformed to improve the linear relationship between
the dependent and the independent variables, and the variance inflation indicators and a
correlation matrix have been calculated to reveal potential multicollinearity. Further, the
RESET test and the White test are run to make sure the zero conditional mean assumption
is valid and to identify potential homoscedasticity. The tests show no sign of violations
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of these OLS assumptions. However, as discussed in chapter 3 and 4, the assumption of
random sampling is harder to confirm, as our data cleaning might have biased our data.
Still, through thorough assessment of the dataset, we feel comfortable assuming that the
dataset is a representative sample of the whole population of venture-backed IPOs.
Consequently, we assume that the dataset does not violate any of the OLS assumptions.
The Gauss-Markov theorem is therefore valid, and our OLS estimators are the Best Linear
Unbiased Estimators (BLUEs) for the model (Wooldridge, 2012). Moreover, normally
distributed unobserved error terms are prefered for exact statistical inference (Wooldridge,
2012). We have therefore analysed the residuals, as well as the distribution of the dependent
variables. With as many as 180 observations, the central limit theorem concludes that
the OLS estimators satisfy asymptotic normality, meaning we can assume we have an
approximate normal distribution (Wooldridge, 2012).
Further details concerning model validation can be found in appendix A2.
5.1 Method: Multiple Regression Analysis 33
5.1.4 Regression Results
Table 5.1 and table 5.2 show the results of our regression analysis, which will be explained
and discussed in subchapter 5.2.
Table 5.1: Regression Results Against Abnormal First-Day Return
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
logtotal-
raised 0.0255* 0.0119 0.0145 0.0226*
(0.051) (0.405) (0.480) (0.079)
logoffer-
size 0.0416** 0.0264 0.0494* 0.0533***0.0381** 0.0461** 0.0448** 0.0564***
(0.030) (0.380) (0.070) (0.009) (0.030) (0.010) (0.025) (0.001)
lognumberof-
employees -0.005 -0.008
(0.786) (0.610)
logageatipo -0.054 -0.026
(0.127) (0.379)
profitnegative 0.130** 0.0841* 0.0834* 0.0952*
(0.014) (0.070) (0.061) (0.033)
over250 0.0008 0.0144 0.0185
(0.990) (0.774) (0.714)
techyn 0.0946** 0.0850** 0.111***
(0.020) (0.036) (0.005)
_cons 0.085 -0.053 0.164 -0.086 -0.062 -0.007 -0.109 0.066 -0.015 -0.142
(0.195) (0.558) (0.216) (0.506) (0.640) (0.933) (0.280) (0.311) (0.871) (0.156)
N 180 180 124 124 180 180 180 180 180 180
R2 0.0213 0.0472 0.0502 0.0745 0.0724 0.0723 0.0907 0.0637 0.0441 0.0677
P-values in parentheses, Significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The regression table reports the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) from the regressions run with
log-transformed abnormal first day returns as the dependent variable.
34 5.2 Findings
Table 5.2: Regression Results Against Abnormal Three-Month Return, Excluding the
First Day of Trading
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
logtotal-
raised -0.027 -0.022 -0.038 -0.024
(0.116) (0.236) (0.174) (0.151)
logoffer-
size -0.013 0.008 -0.015 -0.024 -0.017 -0.025 -0.016 -0.034
(0.597) (0.849) (0.690) (0.366) (0.471) (0.293) (0.555) (0.137)
lognumberof-
employees -0.004 0.006
(0.864) (0.789)
logageatipo 0.052 0.022
(0.279) (0.575)
profitnegative -0.101 -0.087 -0.086 -0.097
(0.158) (0.158) (0.146) (0.101)
over250 -0.096 -0.050 -0.054
(0.246) (0.455) (0.422)
techyn -0.086 -0.076 -0.09*
(0.112) (0.161) (0.086)
_cons 0.178** 0.222* 0.088 0.176 0.196 0.157 0.262* 0.194** 0.137 0.293**
(0.038) (0.064) (0.617) (0.317) (0.266) (0.167) (0.052) (0.024) (0.269) (0.029)
N 180 180 124 124 180 180 180 180 180 180
R2 0.014 0.015 0.032 0.034 0.028 0.022 0.033 0.030 0.011 0.022
P-values in parentheses, Significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The regression table reports the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) from the regressions run with
log-transformed abnormal three-month return as the dependent variable.
5.2 Findings
5.2.1 Amount of Pre-IPO Funding
In the descriptive analysis, we saw few signs of a linear relationship between pre-IPO
funding and post-IPO stock performance. In order to investigate this relation in a slightly
different way, the companies in the dataset are divided into two groups, based on whether
or not they raised more than $250 million in pre-IPO funding. This specific amount is
chosen in order to separate the top quartile from the rest of the dataset, rounded to the
nearest $50 million. There are 43 companies in the group that raised $250 million or
more in pre-IPO funding. As already mentioned, these will for the sake of convenience be
referred to as “heavily funded companies”.
Figure 5.1 displays post-IPO stock performance for companies that raised external funding
before their IPO.
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Figure 5.1: Indexed Average Returns, Much vs. Not-So-Much Funding
The graph on the left displays indexed average post-IPO stock performance with the IPO
offer price as starting point. It is evident that both groups on average are underpriced, and
that heavily funded IPOs were on average more underpriced than other IPOs. However,
over the following three months, the heavily funded companies were outperformed by
the other companies. This is particularly evident when first-day gains are excluded, as
illustrated in the graph on the right. Although both groups appreciated in value, the
average nominal return for companies that raised less than $250 million is approximately
three times those of companies that raised more than $250 million (15% vs. 5%).
If the part of hypothesis 1 about pre-IPO funding and its effect on underpricing is true, we
would expect the variables in the regression models related to funding to be significantly
positive. However, the regression results, displayed in table 5.1, do not confirm our
hypothesis. The continuous variable “logtotalraised” would be significant if there was
a linear relationship between the amount of funding raised and the first-day return.
Although two out of four regressions show significant results for this variable, it is only
at a 10% significance level, and the p-values for the two remaining coefficients are far
from significant. It is also worth noticing that the variable is only significant when it is
not combined with the significant variable for offer size. It is therefore reason to believe
that the significant results for the “logtotalraised” variable in regression (1) and (8) hold
information of the offer size and hence provide biased results.
Even though a linear relationship between the first-day return and the amount of pre-IPO
funding seems unlikely, the most funded companies might still perform differently than
others on their first day of trading. To investigate this relationship, the regressions include
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a dummy variable for heavily funded companies. As our hypotheses are partially motivated
by the performance of the aforementioned unicorns that went public in 2019, and that
the increased access to private funding might have affected their performance, we would
expect the dummy variable to be significant. However, the regressions reveal no significant
differences in first-day return for the companies in the “over250”-category. Based on these
results, the most funded companies do not seem to be more underpriced at IPO than
other companies, and our hypothesis seems to be rejected.
For the three-month time horizon, one of our hypotheses is that pre-IPO funding and
abnormal returns are negatively correlated. Thus, we expect to find that the coefficients
for the explanatory variables related to pre-IPO funding have negative prefixes and are
statistically significant. Although the regression results, as displayed in table 5.2, imply a
negative relationship for both the continuous and the binary variable, the correlations are
not statistically significant. Thus, this hypothesis can be rejected.
5.2.2 Tech Companies vs. Non-Tech Companies
As described in the descriptive analysis chapter, the companies can be divided into industry
categories by using the EU NACE code. Figure 5.2 shows average indexed returns for the
three largest categories, as well as the rest of the companies in the dataset.
Figure 5.2: Indexed Average Returns, by Industry
It is evident that the tech companies were more underpriced than other companies in our
dataset. Over the first three months after the IPO however, manufacturing companies
on average outperform other companies. This applies regardless of whether or not gains
from the first day of trading are included, but is particularly evident when they are
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excluded. From the right graph in figure 5.2, it also appears that tech companies and
companies within professional scientific and technical activities on average experienced
very modest returns in the first three months following their IPO, on average 3.8% and
2.0%, respectively, when first day gains are excluded.
When instead dividing into “tech” and “non-tech” companies, the picture is very similar to
for pre-IPO funding: tech companies are more underpriced than other companies, but
perform worse over the next three months (figure 5.3). After 3 months, and excluding
first-day trading gains, non-tech companies delivered average returns of 17.7%, almost
five times as high as tech companies (3.8%).
Figure 5.3: Indexed Average Returns, Tech vs. Non-Tech IPOs
In the multiple regression results (table 5.1), the tech label seems to have a significant
positive impact on the first-day return. This is consistent throughout all three regressions,
and the results show that if a company is categorized as a tech company, first-day abnormal
return increases with an average of about 9.7%. The scenario of “fads” may be the case
for these companies, as the substantial underpricing can be a sign of investors being
overoptimistic about future potential of companies in the tech industry.
As for the amount of pre-IPO funding, we also expect to find a significant negative
relationship between three-month returns and the tech label. Although the covariaton is
consistently negative, the correlation is only significant in one of the three models, and on
a 10% level. This is also the only statistically significant result of the regressions using
three-month returns as the target variable. Thus, we cannot unambiguously conclude that
tech companies perform worse than other companies on the three-month horizon.
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5.2.3 Offer Size
Like for amount of pre-IPO funding, we separate the dataset into two groups based on
whether or not companies are among the top 25% with regards to size of their IPO. This
split is done at $200 million, and average indexed stock price development for these two
groups are illustrated in figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Indexed Average Returns, Large vs. Not-So-Large IPOs
As expected, IPOs larger than $200 million are on average more underpriced than smaller
IPOs. Whereas the average first-day return for smaller IPOs is 24.1%, the average for
the largest IPOs is 40.7%. Contrary to the other characteristics in scope, however, the
stocks of the largest IPOs in our dataset perform slightly better than others also on the
three-month term, in spite of modest returns in the first month.
The regression analyses clearly demonstrate that offer size is correlated with first-day
returns, with a significance level of 5% or less in 6 out of 8 regressions. This means that
larger IPOs tend to be more underpriced than smaller IPOs. We find that for a one
percent increase in offer size, the first-day abnormal return increases with an average of
4.3%.
For three-month returns, both expectations and results are similar to the previous
characteristics. With one exception, the coefficient prefixes are negative, but none
are statistically significant. Thus, we cannot confirm our hypothesis that larger IPOs are
outperformed by smaller IPOs in the first three months of trading.
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5.2.4 Profitable Companies vs. Unprofitable Companies
Similarly to before, we divide the companies in two groups, this time based on whether or
not they were profitable the year before their IPO. As explained in previous paragraphs,
we will refer to these companies as “profitable” or “unprofitable” companies. There are
41 profitable and 139 unprofitable companies in the dataset. This division seemingly
tells a similar story to earlier, only with different main characters: the unprofitable
companies were on average slightly more underpriced than profitable companies, but
were clearly outperformed by the profitable companies in the following three months
of trading (figure 5.5). After three months of trading, and excluding first-day trading
gains, profitable companies delivered on average a return of 19.8%, whereas unprofitable
companies delivered an average return of 11.2%.
Figure 5.5: Indexed Average Returns, Profitable vs. Unprofitable Companies
As discussed earlier concerning age, companies with a negative profit margin can also be
considered risky investments, leaving an expectation of high first-day returns. One could
therefore expect the dummy variable “profitnegative” to be relevant when analyzing first-
day returns. All regressions show significant results at a 10% or 5% level for “profitnegative”,
and the coefficients hover around 9%. The interpretation of our results is therefore that
companies with a negative profit margin the year before IPO are on average 9% more
underpriced than others.
Unsurprisingly, the coefficient indicates that unprofitable companies are outperformed by
profitable companies on the three-month horizon. Equally unsurprising, this relationship
is not statistically significant - although it is very close to be significant in one of the
four models, where it is significant on a 10.1%-level. Nevertheless, we cannot confirm
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our hypothesis that unprofitable companies going public are outperformed by profitable
companies going public in the first three months of trading.
5.3 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, we analyzed for relationships between post-IPO stock performance and
four key attributes: status as tech company, amount of pre-IPO funding, IPO size, and
negative profitability.
In line with our hypothesis, multiple regression results indicated that each attribute is
associated with high first-day returns and low returns in the subsequent months. However,
correlations are almost without exception statistically significant only for the first day of
trading.
Despite the lack of statistical significance, it is worth noticing that practically all coefficients
in the regressions change from positive to negative when switching from first-day to three-
month returns. The interpretation of this is that factors having a positive effect on
underpricing have a negative effect on three-month performance. This is consistent with
Ritter’s findings, as he finds that firms with high adjusted first-day returns tend to perform
poorly in the aftermarket (Ritter, 1991).
While most of our hypotheses are in line with previous literature, those regarding offer
size are not. Ritter (1991) found that smaller companies tend to be more underpriced
than larger companies. He also found that younger companies are more underpriced
than older companies. Ritter argues that growth companies are considered more exposed
to aftermarket risk than mature companies, and experience a higher first-day return.
This is consistent with the findings of Shen and Goo (2019), that aftermarket risk and
first-day returns are positively correlated. However, whereas the largest IPOs used to
involve mature, stable companies, the largest IPOs of the last decade have rather involved
growth companies with uncertain futures in terms of delivering lasting profits. This change
might explain why the relationship between the size of the initial offer and the level of
underpricing has turned.
Pre-IPO funding turned out to be the least influential of the four attributes. Considering
the increasing access to private equity capital for unlisted companies combined with
disappointing performance of recent heavily funded companies going public, we expected
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to find a stronger relationship. However, the analyses indicated a stronger relationship
between offer size and returns. As the companies that caught our attention - such as
Uber, Lyft and Slack - are among both the most venture-backed and the largest IPOs, it
appears that offer size might be a better proxy for hype than funding.
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6 Analyzing Combinations of Attributes
In this chapter, we will investigate our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: When combining the characteristics, their effects on both first-day return
and three-month return will be even stronger than they are individually
Groups of companies are formed by combining characteristics based on the significant
relationships observed in the regressions. Even though the significant results were primarily
found for the first-day return, we will investigate whether combinations of these attributes
also have an impact on the three-month return. Despite not finding a linear relationship
between offer size and the three-month return, the largest IPOs may still perform differently
than others. For further analysis we will therefore investigate companies with an offer size
above $200 million, as well as tech companies and unprofitable companies. Companies
with an offer size above $200 million will be referred to as “large IPOs”. The dummy
variable for heavily funded companies did not provide significant results in the regressions,
and will not be included in further analysis. However, as illustrated in figure 6.1, these
groups of companies are, unsurprisingly, largely the same.
Figure 6.1: Overlap Between Large IPOs and Heavily Funded Companies
6.1 Rephrasing the Hypothesis
When we split the dataset into groups based on the four attributes in the previous chapter,
the pattern was always the same: companies holding the attribute had on average higher
first-day returns and lower three-month returns than other companies. This raises an
obvious question: are we looking at virtually the same group of companies over and over?
If not, can combinations of variables yield even more conclusive results? The first question
can be answered by looking at the Venn diagram in figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Overlapping Characteristics
Of the 180 companies in the dataset, 77% (139) were not profitable the year before their
IPO. This is more or less consistent when combining with other groups: 82% of tech
companies were not profitable the year before their IPO, whereas the number is slightly
lower for companies with an offer size above $200 million (59%). 12 companies in the
dataset hold all three attributes.
It is therefore clear that even though a similar pattern can be observed for the individual
characteristics, the companies within each category are not the same. This finding indicates
that if each attribute affect the aftermarket performance in similar directions, companies
holding a combination of the attributes should experience even stronger effects.
With the previous paragraphs in mind, our hypothesis for the combined variables can be
rephrased as follows:
When combining the characteristics “tech”, “unprofitable” and “large IPO”, the positive
effect on first-day returns and negative effect on returns in the subsequent three months
will be even stronger than the effect of each characteristic individually
In this chapter, we will investigate whether this is true.
6.2 Method: Mann-Whitney U Test
Figure 6.2 presents how the relevant characteristics overlap, and thereby how groups
of companies holding more than one characteristic are formed. Returns for members
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of these groups will be compared with returns for non-members through a two-sample
Mann-Whitney U test (also called the Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
The Mann-Whitney U test investigates whether two samples are significantly different
from each other. The test does not require normally distributed observations, and can be
used for samples of different sizes. As it uses the sum of the ranks of the observations,
instead of the mean of each sample, outliers will not gain too much weight in the test.
To further investigate the dataset, the Mann-Whitney U test will be used to test the
following groups against the rest of the dataset:
1. Tech companies with large IPOs
2. Unprofitable tech companies
3. Unprofitable companies with large IPOs
4. Unprofitable tech companies with large IPOs
In line with our hypothesis, we expect to find that all groups perform different than others,
with a better first-day performance, and a worse performance in the three-month time
frame.
6.2.1 Test Results
Table 6.1 and 6.2 show the results of the Mann-Whitney U tests, which will be explained
and discussed in subchapter 6.3.
Table 6.1: Mann-Whitney U Test: First-Day Return
Group compared to the rest of the dataset Significant? Performancecompared to others
Tech companies with large IPOs (18 obs) Yes,
α = 5%
Better in 67.1% of all
cases
Unprofitable tech companies (46 obs) Yes,
α = 1%
Better in 69.3% of all
cases
Unprofitable companies with large IPOs (26 obs) Yes,
α = 1%
Better in 67.2% of all
cases
Unprofitable tech companies with large IPOs
(12 obs)
Yes,
α = 1%
Better in 73.3% of all
cases
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Table 6.2: Mann-Whitney U Test: Three-Month Return
Group compared to the rest of the dataset Significant? Performancecompared to others
Tech companies with large IPOs (18 obs) No Worse in 59.9% of allcases
Unprofitable tech companies (46 obs) Yes,
α = 10%
Worse in 59.1% of all
cases
Unprofitable companies with large IPOs (26 obs) No Worse in 56.1% of allcases
Unprofitable tech companies with large IPOs
(12 obs) No
Worse in 61.5% of all
cases
6.3 Findings
6.3.1 Tech Companies With Large IPOs
Out of 56 tech IPOs in the dataset, 18 were larger than $200 million. Figure 6.3 displays
average stock development calculated from offer price and closing price after the first day
of trading for this group compared to the other 162 companies in the dataset.
Figure 6.3: Indexed Average Returns, Tech Companies With Large IPOs
The patterns are similar to those observed earlier: higher first-day returns for the large
tech IPOs than for other IPOs, while the large tech IPOs are outperformed in the next
three months of trading. Specifically, tech companies with large IPOs had on average
17.5 percentage points higher first-day returns than other companies, and 15.2 percentage
points lower returns in the next three months.
The Mann-Whitney U test results, as shown in tables 6.1 and 6.2, confirm that tech
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companies with large IPOs outperform others on the first day of trading, with a higher
return in 67.1% of all cases. This result is significant at a 5% level, and supports our
hypothesis.
On the three-month horizon, large tech IPOs deliver lower returns than other companies
59.9% of the time. However, this underperformance is not significant.
6.3.2 Unprofitable Tech Companies
There are 46 tech companies that were unprofitable the year before IPO, making it the
largest overlap of the characteristics that are being examined. These companies had an
average first-day return of 39.1%, 14.2 percentage points above other companies. As
expected, the next three months generate far lower returns. The stocks of the unprofitable
tech companies increased by on average 1.7% - 15.8 percentage points lower than other
companies.
Figure 6.4: Indexed Average Returns, Unprofitable Tech Companies
From the regressions in table 5.1 we find that the significance of unprofitable companies is
not consistent at a 5% level. However, the unprofitable tech companies perform significantly
better than others on the first trading day. Companies in this group outperform other
companies going public in 69.3% of all cases, leaving them the pairwise combination of
attributes that most often generates higher first-day returns than others. This result is
significant at a 1% significance level.
As the only group with significant results in the three-month time frame, the unprofitable
tech companies’ performance is found to be significantly different than others in the
Mann-Whitney U test, at a 10% significance level. This group has a lower three-month
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return than others in 59.1% of all cases. Comparing the results from the tests done for
the first-day return and the three-month return, the unprofitable tech companies provide
the most significant results for both models, but with opposite effects. In other words,
our hypothesis seems to be confirmed for this specific combination of characteristics.
6.3.3 Unprofitable Companies With Large IPOs
26 companies with IPOs larger than $200 million were unprofitable the year before IPO.
As shown in figure 6.5, these companies had on average 21.5 percentage points higher
first-day returns than other companies, similar to the groups examined above. In the
following three months, they also achieved on average higher returns than others, by 4.25
percentage points. Although this irregular pattern might be a consequence of being an
average of rather few observations, it is the first assessed group that breaks with the
pattern of higher first-day returns followed by lower returns over the next months.
Figure 6.5: Indexed Average Returns, Unprofitable Companies With Large IPOs
As one could expect based on the non-statistic analysis, results from the Mann-Whitney
U test are highly significant for first-day returns. It returns a significance level of 1%, and
shows that unprofitable companies with large IPOs perform better than other companies
in 67.2% of all cases.
Unsurprisingly, the better performance found for the three-month period is not significant.
However, despite having higher average returns than others, the Mann-Whitney U test
states that the group performs worse than others. A likely explanation is that the group
includes for instance Beyond Meat, whose aforementioned sky high returns both on the first
day and the next three months of trading pulled the average significantly up. Nevertheless,
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with non-significant results, we cannot confirm our hypothesis that unprofitable companies
with large IPOs perform worse than others on the three-month horizon.
6.3.4 Unprofitable Tech Companies With Large IPOs
As the Venn diagram in figure 6.2 shows, there are 12 companies that hold all three
attributes. As we have found each attribute to impact stock performance, expectations
are high that the combination of all three attributes will yield significant results that align
with our hypothesis on both time horizons. Figure 6.6 shows that the unprofitable tech
companies with large IPOs had a 23.5 percentage points higher average first-day return
than other companies. Over the next three months, however, they were outperformed by
a margin of 18.3 percentage points.
Figure 6.6: Indexed Average Returns, All Three Attributes
The Mann-Whitney U test confirms that this is the group that most often outperform
others the first day of trading, generating higher first-day returns that others in 73.3 of
all cases. Unsurprisingly, this finding is significant at a 1% significance level.
Consisting of companies holding all of the three attributes, we expected this group to
differ significantly from others also on the three-month horizon. The results from the
Mann-Whitney U test states that the group performs worse in 61.5% of all cases, but,
slightly unexpected, this result is not significant.
6.4 Summary and Discussion 49
6.4 Summary and Discussion
This chapter has focused on answering whether our hypothesis regarding companies
holding more than one of the mentioned attributes hold true. As stated in the beginning
of the chapter, our hypothesis was that:
When combining the characteristics “tech”, “unprofitable” and “large IPO”, the positive
effect on first-day returns and negative effect on returns in the subsequent three months
will be even stronger than the effect of each characteristic individually
To answer whether this is true, both non-statistical and statistical analyses have been
used. We found that for the pairwise combinations of the attributes, all three groups
perform significantly better than other companies on the first day of trading. Of the
pairwise combinations of attributes, the group of unprofitable companies with large IPOs
performs better than others in the most cases. Results were even clearer for companies
holding all three attributes.
Despite the regressions’ lack of significant correlations for the three-month return, we
believed that the Mann-Whitney U test would uncover significant patterns. Although the
results from the Mann-Whitney U test state that all groups in the test perform worse than
other companies in the time frame of three months, only one group provide significant
results; the unprofitable tech companies.
In total, all groups deliver higher first-day returns than others, followed by worse
performance in the next three months. By the nature of the categories, the high first-day
returns may be related to the “hype” of these kinds of companies, or the “fads” as Ritter
defined them. As the results are opposite for the performance after three months of
trading, excluding this positive first-day trading gain, the differences seem to diminish
and the total returns from the initial offer evens out to some extent. This is consistent
with Ritter’s research. He states that his findings indicate that the underpriced companies
are not priced too low, but their market value at the end of the first day is set too high
(Ritter, 1991). In our analysis, we see similar trends, but as the three-month results are
not consistently significant we cannot draw the same conclusions as Ritter. This might be
caused by our shorter time frame of three months, compared to his time frame of three
years.
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7 Conclusion
We have investigated post-IPO stock performance of initial public offerings on the New
York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq that raised private funding before going public. We
looked for relationships between stock performance in the first three months of trading and
selected publicly available information. Our hypotheses were that status as tech company,
amount of pre-IPO funding, IPO size, and negative profitability have (1) positive impact
on stock performance on the first day of trading, (2) negative impact on stock performance
in the subsequent three months, and (3) that impacts are even stronger for combinations
of the attributes. This was tested for by making use of multiple regression analyses, as
well as Mann-Whitney U tests.
Our regression analyses provided evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship
between offer size and first-day returns. The models also indicated that tech companies
achieve higher first-day returns than non-tech companies, and that unprofitable companies
achieve higher first-day returns than profitable companies. When looking at stock
performance in the three months following the first day of trading, however, the regression
analyses did not provide any statistically significant results.
When instead splitting the dataset into groups based on the four attributes, the Mann-
Whitney U test partially confirmed that combinations of the attributes yield even more
conclusive results. For first-day returns, all combinations yielded significant results. For
the next three months, however, only the combination of negative profitability and tech
proved to be significant.
Thus, the results partially confirmed our hypotheses, and is in line with previous research
done on the subject. Hype and aftermarket risk are typically associated with high first-day
returns, which in turn are associated with low returns in the subsequent time period.
With increasing access to private equity financing, tech companies’ convincing promises
to change the world, and decreasing investor demands for profitability in the immediate
future, today’s companies going public are larger, more hyped and less profitable than
ever before. Given our findings, and that these trends in the IPO landscape persist, we
can thus expect average stock returns of future IPOs to be higher on the first-day and
lower in the longer run than what they are today.
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Suggestions for Further Research
Although our analyses provide some significant evidence of factors related to aftermarket
performance of venture-backed IPOs, we see several ways of doing further research on
the field. Firstly, it is possible to challenge the tech classification. Thompson (2019)
argues that several of the high-profile IPOs of 2019 that have depreciated in value are
not “real tech companies”. Several of them either sell both hardware and software - like
the stationary-bike company Peloton - or their core offering is a digital marketplace
for transaction of services in the physical world - such as Uber and Lyft. Singling out
these “non-pure-tech” companies rather than all tech companies might have produced
more significant results. Peloton, Uber and Lyft, as well as Spotify, Groupon and Snap,
also have in common that they are consumer-facing, and thus naturally more prone to
hype than for instance niche enterprise tech companies - potentially impacting both their
pre-market valuations and aftermarket performance.
Secondly, a longer observation period than three months could be applied. We saw for
some of the group comparisons that the graphs were seemingly moving further apart from
each other over time, potentially indicating that a longer observation period could have
yielded clearer results. However, this is not at all guaranteed, and the differences might
just as well decrease over time.
Finally, a larger dataset might have provided clearer and more robust results. We were
constrained by availability of accounting data, limiting the dataset to IPOs from 2011
onwards. Having access to data from further back in time would increase the amount of
observations, thus improving the robustness of our analyses. However, older data might
not reflect the aforementioned trends in the IPO landscape. Hence, it could be even more
interesting to perform this exercise again at a later stage.
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Appendix
A1 Fuzzy String Matching
Table A1.1: Stock Splits Identified for Tickers in Dataset
Ticker Name from SDC Platinum Name from Investing.com Offer PriceMultiplicator
Fuzz
Score
Same
Company?
ET Exacttarget Inc Energy Transfer 0.25 27 No
HCA HCA Holdings Inc HCA 0.22 32 Yes
TTPH Tetraphase Pharmaceuticals Tetraphase 20.00 50 Yes
FRAN Francesca’s Holdings Francescas 12.00 61 Yes
GNCA Genocea Biosciences Genocea Bio 8.00 65 Yes
SRC Spirit Realty Capital Spirit Realty 2.62 68 Yes
OSMT Osmotica Pharmaceuticals Osmotica Pharma 0.50 70 Yes
HTBX Heat Biologics Inc Heat Biologics 10.00 88 Yes
RWLK Rewalk Robotics Ltd Rewalk Robotics 25.00 88 Yes
WLH William Lyon Homes Inc William Lyon Homes 8.25 90 Yes
OBLN Obalon Therapeutics Inc Obalon Therapeutics 10.00 90 Yes
ONTX Onconova Therapeutics Inc Onconova Therapeutics 150.00 91 Yes
SFBS Servisfirst Bancshares Inc Servisfirst Bancshares 0.17 92 Yes
Table A1.2: Fuzzy String Matching of Company Names
Ticker Name rom SDC Platinum Name from Yahoo Finance FuzzScore
Same
Company?
EARN Ellington Residential Earn 17 No
VLRS Controladora Vuela Volaris 26 No
ET Energy Transfer LP Exacttarget Inc 30 No
EGRX Eagle Pharmaceuticals Eagle 31 Yes
IFRX Inflarx N.V. Fireman BV 36 No
PUYI Puyi American Depository Puyi Inc 41 Yes
ULTA Ulta Beauty Inc Ulta Salon Cosmetic 42 Yes
ARMK Aramark Aramark Holdings Corp 50 Yes
FBNK Facebank Group Inc First Connecticut Bancorp 51 No
APTV Aptiv PLC Delphi Automotive PLC 53 No
TC Tuanche Limited Tuanche Internet Info 55 Yes
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Linearity in the Parameters
The assumption of linearity depends on the dependent variable being a linear function
of the independent variable (Wooldridge, 2014). This assumption is not very restrictive,
as both the dependent and the independent variables can be arbitrary functions of the
underlying parameters of interest. Non-linear parameters can be transformed to linear
variables in the model through for example functions of natural logarithms and squares.
In our dataset, several variables are log-transformed to improve the linear relationship
between the dependent and the independent variables.
Random Sampling
For the sample to be representative for the whole population it is crucial that it is collected
randomly. Our data is collected from sources we consider reliable, and we gathered
all IPOs for the time period we are investigating. The dataset we started with should
therefore be representative. However, our data cleaning might bias our data. As data
points were missing for many observations, the final dataset only holds information on a
fraction of the total number of IPOs in the time period. We cannot be completely sure
that the deleted observations were randomly chosen, as there might be reasons why some
companies did not have all data points registered. This might bias our results.
No Perfect Collinearity
The assumption of no perfect collinearity states that there can be no constant independent
variables, and no exact linear relationship between the independent variables (Wooldridge,
2014). For dummy variables or variables representing shares of a whole, the model cannot
include all shares, or mutually exclusive dummies, as they will be perfectly dependent on
each other.
While perfect collinearity violates one of the assumptions for the OLS model,
multicollinearity can still be included. Multicollinearity can be defined as a high, but not
perfect, correlations between the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2014). A model with
multicollinearity will provide the best OLS estimates, but it will not be as precise due to
larger standard errors. One solution is to remove one of the correlated variables, but it is
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important to be aware that it might lead to omitted variable bias. Whether to include the
correlated variables or not, is therefore a tradeoff between precision and bias. For research
purposes, multicollinearity can create problems, as statistical inference is more difficult.
However, when looking for causality, we often favor avoiding the omitted variable bias
over good precision (Wooldridge, 2012).
In our dataset, multicollinearity is tested for by calculating the variance inflation indicator
(VIF) found in table 1 and through the correlation matrix shown in table 2. Science argue
what size a VIF can hold without causing issues in the regressions, due to high correlation.
The VIFs observed in table 1 are far below the most commonly used limit of 10, but even
when using the more conservative level of 4 (PennState Science, 2018) as our limit, our
variables show no sign of severe correlation.
The correlation matrix shown as table 2 confirms the conclusion from the VIF calculations.
With correlations higher than 0,8 severe problems with multicollinearity commonly appear,
but in the correlation matrix of our independent variables we find no values of such size.
The highest values of correlation is found for the variables "over250" and "lntotalraised",
with a correlation of 0.7262. This observation seems to be natural, as the dummy variable
"over250" is calculated directly from the value of the total amount raised before IPO. The
second largest value is found for the number of employees and the size of the IPO, with a
correlation of 0.6320.
Table A2.1: Correlation Matrix
lntotal-
raised
lnpri..-
amount
ln..-
employees
lnage-
atipo
profit-
negative over250 tech
lntotalraised 1.0000
lnoffersize 0.5474 1.0000
lnno.ofemployees 0.2163 0.6320 1.0000
lnageatipo -0.0612 0.0549 0.3089 1.0000
profitnegative 0.0004 -0.2461 -0.3048 -0.3307 1.0000
over250 0.7262 0.5265 0.3744 0.0401 -0.1232 1.0000
tech 0.0636 0.2270 0.3506 -0.1399 0.1039 0.1206 1.0000
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Zero Conditional Mean
The zero conditional mean assumption is a key assumption to be able to draw conclusions
on causality. It states that the unobserved factors is independent of the independent
variable, which means that the error term u have an expected value of zero given any
value of the independent variable E(u|x) = 0 (Wooldridge, 2012). When this assumption
is violated x is often called endogenous.
If the original equation satisfies the zero conditional mean assumption, then no nonlinear
functions of the independent variables should be significant when added to the model
(Wooldridge, 2012). With this rule as a basis, Ramsey’s (1969) regression specification
error test (RESET) investigates whether the assumption holds for a given regression
model. The RESET test is used to detect functional misspecification in our dataset,
and show no signs of omitted variables. The p-value for the regression model with the
log-transformed abnormal first day return as the dependent variables is 0.3538, and the
regression model with the log-transformed abnormal three-month return as the dependent
variable the p-value is 0.2254. Both p-values are above the traditional significant level
of 5%, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of not having omitted variables in the
models. We will therefore assume that the variables are exogenous, resulting in unbiased
coefficient estimates in the regressions.
Although this may be true, discussions regarding whether the RESET test is an accurate
way of detecting omitted variables are present. Wooldridge argues that the test has
no power for detecting omitted variables if their expectations are linear in the included
independent variables in the model (Wooldridge, 2012). For testing functional form,
however, the RESET test is established as a good approach.
Homoscedasticity
For the assumption of homoscedasticity to hold true, the variance of the unobserved
factors, the error term, need to be constant for any given value of the explanatory variables
(Wooldridge, 2012). This assumption is important for creating an efficient OLS model,
and a violation will result in less precise estimations. However, heteroskedasticity does not
cause inconsistency or bias in the estimators of the coefficients, nor affects the goodness
of fit (R2) of the OLS model.
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To investigate whether the dataset holds signs of heteroskedasticity, the White’s test
is used. With first day return as the dependent variable, the regression generates a χ2
-value of 31,71 and a p-value is 0.4811. For the three-month return the results are almost
identical, with a χ2 -value of 30.56 and a p-value of 0.5397. With p-values far from what
would be necessary to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, we can, according
to the Gauss-Markov theorem, assume that the regressions is the best unbiased linear
estimator.
The Normality Assumption
For the OLS to be the best linear unbiased estimator there are no requirements of normality.
However, normally distributed unobserved error terms are prefered for exact statistical
inference (Wooldridge, 2012). For the normality assumption to hold, the unobserved
population errors need to be independent of the explanatory variables and normally
distributed with zero mean and variance σ2 (Wooldridge, 2012). As the error term, u, is
unobserved, we will investigate the residuals, u_hat, as well as the distribution of the
dependent variables. To determine whether the residuals are normally distributed, we
have plotted the residuals in a histogram, before using the Skewness and kurtosis test for
normality.
(a) Residuals, First-Day Return (b) Residuals, Three-Month Return
Figure A2.1: Distribution of Residuals, u_hat
Both histograms show that most residuals have values close to zero. The histogram
representing the residuals for the regression run with the log-transformed abnormal first
day return as the dependent variable seem to have more negative observations than
positive, while the histogram for the three months return looks more evenly distributed
A2 OLS Violations 59
around zero. To test whether the skewness is significant enough to reject a null hypothesis
of normally distributed residuals, we use the Skewness and kurtosis test for normality.
For the first day return regression, the test generates a p-value of 0.0373. As this is less
than the 5% significant level, we can reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution
of the residuals. However, the three-month regression received different results. The
Skewness and kurtosis test for normality generates a p-value of 0.3557 and we cannot
reject that the residuals are normally distributed. See appendix 1 for the Stata output.
Further, the dependent variables are assessed. As a starting point, the distribution of
the non-logged abnormal return variables are investigated, before looking at the log-
transformed versions.
(a) Abnormalreturn1 (b) Abnormalreturn90
Figure A2.2: Distribution of Non-Logged Variables
(a) Logabnormalreturn1 (b) Logabnormalreturn90
Figure A2.3: Distribution of Log-Transformed Variables
The Kernel density estimates for the abnormal returns before logging the variables, show a
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distribution that is heavily skewed to the right. Logging them clearly gives better results,
with distributions closer to normality. Some skewness is still observable, especially when
looking at the first day return were the Kernel density curve has maximum point at a
lower value than the normal distribution. The distribution of the three-month return
variable seems to follow the normal distribution quite well. To determine whether the
skewness is significant enough to reject a null hypothesis of normal distribution, we use
the Skewness and kurtosis test for normality.
The p-values for the logged dependent variables confirm our observation that the dependent
variables are closer to being normally distributed when they are log-transformed. The
p-values of the non-logged variables were 0.0000, confidently rejecting the null hypothesis of
normality. When log-transforming the dependent variables, the p-values are of greater size.
For the logged three-month return variable, the p-value of 0.2901 is not significant, and
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution. However, the first day-return
still receives a significant p-value of 0.0014, and we have to reject the null hypothesis at
the 5% significant level. As with the residuals, normality for the three-month return error
seem more likely than for the errors of the first day return model.
We can conclude that the log-transforming dependent variables improved the distribution,
but were not sufficient to achieve normality for both models. This may be caused by
outliers in our dataset. The most extreme observations are not excluded, but they
have been investigated to be sure that the data is correct. However, with a number of
observation as high as 180, the central limit theorem conclude that the OLS estimators
satisfy asymptotic normality, meaning we can assume we have an approximate normal
distribution (Wooldridge, 2012).
